On Friday afternoon, L3Harris Technologies was doing what it has done at Federal Aviation Administration facilities month after month: moving a communications line off decades-old copper and onto fiber, work that federal auditors count as part of a $12.5 billion overhaul of the country’s air traffic control system.
Shortly after a technician installed a new router at an FAA radio site in El Dorado, Arkansas, the device began pumping out data—so much that the flood disrupted communications at 17 of the 22 so-called en route centers that handle high-altitude traffic.
At 3:36 p.m. Eastern, with about 3,500 planes in the air, the FAA held all departures nationwide. The stop lasted more than four hours, until 8:15 p.m. Airlines canceled more than 5,000 flights by Saturday and about 1,500 more on Sunday as they repositioned crews and aircraft. It was the first nationwide ground stop since January 2023, when the system that sends safety notices to pilots failed.
“We haven’t determined what the fault was,” Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy said at a Saturday news conference. Investigators are trying to establish whether L3Harris installed or configured the router incorrectly, or whether the equipment itself was at fault. Adam Bauer, a spokesperson for Hewlett Packard Enterprise, which owns router maker Juniper Networks, told Fast Company its devices appeared to have worked as intended. “Based on what we know and have been told by others, our equipment was working as configured.”
But the failure exposed weaknesses the FAA has been warned about for years: a contractor that has run the FAA’s network since 2002 and has a record of outages, an integrator the agency’s own staff rated a financial risk, a technician workforce the FAA admits is understaffed, and a $12.5 billion overhaul that auditors say is racing ahead without a master schedule. There is no evidence yet that any of them caused Friday’s failure.
Still, some critics see Friday’s chaos as years of warnings come true. “The sad fact is this has happened before,” Mary Schiavo, a former Transportation Department inspector general, told NPR’s Weekend Edition.
The sprawling network of copper and fiber that carries the country’s air traffic communications across roughly 4,400 FAA sites still runs largely on technology that dates back decades. Some older equipment, including radar, requires replacement parts that can only be obtained through online auction websites or made with 3D printers. In 2023, an FAA-commissioned panel of outside experts warned that the condition of the agency’s facilities and equipment was “elevating system risk to unsustainable levels.” The agency under President Joe Biden had commissioned another group of aviation experts to examine air traffic control in October 2024, but weeks after Trump took office, the group learned it was being disbanded, The Washington Post reported.
Last May, Duffy said the FAA was speeding up its overhaul of the system under a program called BNATCS, or the Brand New Air Traffic Control System. Congress approved $12.5 billion for the effort, which aims to modernize the telecom network by the end of 2028, before the end of Trump’s term, and 21 months ahead of an earlier September 2030 target.
In September, the Government Accountability Office released its latest report on the overhaul. The FAA was moving at an unprecedented speed, auditors said, but without a reliable lifecycle cost estimate or an integrated master schedule. Instead, auditors counted 11,389 separate project schedules that had not been coordinated, so different programs were booked to visit the same sites repeatedly or in ways that risk “excessive disruptions to air traffic control operations” and could jeopardize the FAA’s “aggressive deployment schedule.” Delays, in turn, could leave controllers reliant on outdated systems that are prone to failure, and “lead to more system outages, ground stops, flight delays, and safety incidents.”
The GAO auditors also found the agency had exempted the effort from nearly all of its standard acquisition rules. Schedule pressure on federal programs can lead teams to skip or compress testing, they warned. “In essence, the FAA is buying delivery speed at the risk of cost uncertainty and potential disruptions,” the GAO wrote.
The incident has also drawn attention to Peraton, the Herndon, Va.-based defense contractor hired last December to manage the broader overhaul, under a contract with a $1.5 billion ceiling. Politico reported in June that one lobbyist—a former Duffy spokesperson who sits on the board of a nonprofit linked to the Transportation Secretary—lobbied for Peraton in the period when it won its FAA contract. (The FAA has said that Duffy played no role in the company’s selection.)
By August, FAA officials were frustrated with Peraton’s performance, according to a September Politico report, citing people familiar with the matter who described slipping schedules and a contractor that was not managing the project. Peraton was “not sophisticated with how the FAA works” and was being asked to sprint from the start, one person told Politico. The same person said the FAA was partly to blame, accusing the agency of blocking Peraton’s efforts to work with its own staff.
As the FAA began its investigation into the cause of the router issues on Saturday, Schiavo told NPR that uncoordinated schedules and a rush to patch the system had made such a failure predictable. “What did the GAO conclude? That it will result in air traffic outages and disruptions. And there we are.”
The FAA and L3Harris take different approaches to scheduling
The trouble first showed up as interruptions at the FAA’s Indianapolis center, as a surge of data flooded the network’s older routers. A flurry of erratic radar feeds and communication drop-offs with aircraft led officials to order a ground stop. Soon troubleshooters traced the issue to the El Dorado router and to a second one at a radar site in Amarillo, Texas; when both were cut off from the network, the problems stopped. Officials have zeroed in on a feature on the new Juniper routers that broadcast data more widely than necessary. The FAA has since switched the feature off on all of its Juniper routers. The two suspect routers are being tested in Florida with help from Juniper and Cisco engineers, L3Harris and the FBI.
“Was it a faulty installation? Was it a faulty configuration?” FAA Administrator Bryan Bedford asked on Saturday, adding that the agency would have to rethink how it carries out upgrades.
Asked why the work was done on a busy Friday afternoon, Duffy cited the urgency of the upgrades and said the site was far from major flight corridors. But he added: “there will be a reevaluation of when we do this work.”
The timing contrasts with how L3Harris describes its own method. In an interview published in March, Chris Collings, the L3Harris vice president who runs the business, said the company never switches network segments off. At critical sites with two paths, he said, crews upgrade one path, validate it, then upgrade the other, during low-traffic windows. The network is designed to contain a local fault, so why one remote radio site could disrupt most of the country’s en route centers remains unexplained.
Duffy repeatedly blamed the contractor. “We’re going to hold people accountable,” he said, adding that many contractors “take our money and provide really poor service.” He also told reporters he was “stuck with L3Harris.”
In a statement, L3Harris said it was supporting the agency’s investigation, and that it “takes the nationwide ground stop and its impact on travelers, airlines and air traffic operations seriously.”
The FAA said that one of its representatives helped an L3Harris technician gain access to an agency site on Friday. The union for FAA technicians, however, said its members had no part in the work. Historically, it said in a statement Saturday, contractors have relied on FAA employees to assess risk and coordinate maintenance, but its “technicians were not involved in the upgrades that led to the ground stop.”
The FAA has acknowledged that its technician workforce is understaffed and released a workforce plan in May 2026 calling for an increase of at least 750 more certified technicians by 2030. “However, little progress has been made on hiring those new technicians,” the union said.
The FAA and L3Harris did not respond to a set of emailed questions for this story.
A push to shift from L3Harris to AT&T
L3Harris, based in Melbourne, Fla., specializes in defense, but it has run the FAA Telecommunications Infrastructure network, known as FTI, since its predecessor Harris Corp. won the contract in 2002. The company says it has already converted 70% of the copper-to-fiber conversion.
The agency has had warnings about the network for years, including a failure strikingly like Friday’s. On Nov. 19, 2009, an FTI outage hit 129 air traffic facilities. The inspector general concluded that configuration and procedural errors by Harris caused the outage and delayed restoring service. A Harris engineer had put a new router into service in Los Angeles that carried a configuration error. Even after fixes, the inspector general noted, FAA and Harris officials acknowledged a continuing risk of critical outages.
The FAA has since faulted the company publicly. After a September 2025 telecom outage at the Dallas approach-control facility halted flights at both of the city’s major airports for hours, the agency blamed failures in service from local carrier Frontier Communications. It added: “Oversight by L3Harris, an FAA contractor, failed to ensure that redundancies in the system functioned properly.” L3Harris responded that it and the carriers had warned the FAA for years that the circuits needed replacing, but the money never came.
This September, a primary circuit serving the Philadelphia approach-control facility failed, and after L3Harris advised switching to a backup fiber line, which turned out to have been cut by a construction crew in New Jersey. About 9,500 U.S. flights were delayed or canceled. “When it fails, we just don’t have the redundancy” of a modern architecture, Bedford said at the time.
The FAA is already moving to replace FTI. In August, using waiver authority tied to the modernization program, it made a single, undefinitized award to AT&T to lead the FAA Enterprise Network Services program, FTI’s successor. The award started with a $74.3 million task order for what the FAA expects to be a multibillion-dollar contract lasting up to 15 years. In September, Bedford called for an additional $10.5 billion from Congress for the project. On Saturday, Duffy said that Verizon and Lumen were also “ready to go” on the upgrade. Until that transition is done, L3Harris remains the operator, and the contractor converting the FAA’s copper lines.
The FAA network is a small part of a company that has become more central to the administration’s priorities. L3Harris, which reported $21.9 billion in revenue last year, converted a Boeing 747 donated by Qatar into an interim Air Force One this year. It worked against a July 4 deadline that, Democratic senators say, forced it to scale back the usual upgrade package. (The Air Force has said the work would cost less than $400 million; the contract is classified.)
In January, the Pentagon agreed to invest $1 billion in L3Harris’s missile business, which the company plans to spin off—a rare direct federal stake in a major defense supplier. And in July, the Space Force awarded L3Harris up to $955 million to build 18 missile-defense satellites for the Golden Dome shield, bringing its orders for U.S. missile-tracking and defense satellites to at least 70. L3Harris shares fell tk percent on Monday, the first trading day after the ground stop, and are down [tk] percent this year after peaking in early March.
What the GAO found about the FAA upgrade
The GAO’s September report examined the FAA’s upgrade. Of the $12.5 billion Congress allocated, $9 billion is for systems modernization. Telecommunications is one of 13 programs in the overhaul’s first phase: replacing 5,170 copper lines with fiber and moving nearly 30,000 services to Internet Protocol. GAO figures show the program’s estimated cost rising from about $4.75 billion to about $5.91 billion.
The auditors’ main findings:
- There’s no reliable cost estimate. In June the FAA put phase one’s systems work at $10.6 billion, but officials could not produce the analysis behind the figure, telling auditors it would take a tremendous effort to find. The estimate omits government costs, most operating and maintenance costs and all of phase two. The FAA says it needs another $10.8 billion.
- There’s no master schedule. Peraton, the prime systems integrator, delivered a preliminary integrated master schedule in April. As of May, though, the 11,389 project schedules had not been integrated, which risked inefficiencies and conflicts with airport operations. Officials said loading them all into their scheduling tool “would not be useful or helpful.” The FAA planned to use an artificial intelligence tool to flag conflicts, but as of May it was still being tested and rules for using it had not been set.
- Rules were waived. In August 2025, Bedford issued a blanket waiver exempting the program from nearly all of the FAA’s acquisition management requirements, including the one that would require a lifecycle cost estimate. The GAO called that a key reason no such estimate exists.
The Transportation Department partly agreed with the GAO’s two recommendations: build a reliable lifecycle cost estimate and a detailed integrated master schedule. In its reply, the department said 12 of 13 workstreams, covering over 95 percent of project tasks, were on plan as of July. According to the FAA’s public Modern Skies dashboard, 11 out of 12 programs are at or ahead of plan. The exception is the replacement of analog protocol converters, devices that turn analog signals into digital ones, which stands at 8 percent complete, with just 45 of 69 planned sites completed in the most recent month recorded.
The FAA has said it will answer the GAO’s September recommendations in detail within 180 days of the report, a deadline that falls in March.
Whose upgrade was it?
Bedford tried to separate Friday’s failure from the modernization program. “We’re conflating modernization with this upgrade at this particular facility. We spend $1 billion a year maintaining and sustaining the existing 1980s [legacy] telco network,” Bedford said. “This is not part of the Peraton-FAA $12.5 billion modernization effort.”
That contrasts with the GAO’s account, which lists the copper-to-fiber program as part of phase one of the modernization. And according to the GAO, existing program contracts were modified to give Peraton authority to manage the other contractors on the FAA’s behalf. “Peraton, think of them as an extension of me,” Bedford said in April.
Peraton was seen as an underdog for the FAA job, in part because it had little prior experience working with the agency. The company itself grew out of the government IT services unit of Harris Corp., L3Harris’ predecessor, which private equity firm Veritas Capital bought and rebranded as Peraton in 2017.
Before the FAA award, agency staff had rated the company a high risk for financial instability in an October 2025 presentation to Duffy, Bloomberg reported in September. When agency staff evaluated the bids last year, they graded Peraton and Parsons, which bid alongside IBM, on four technical criteria, according to the presentation. Parsons rated better on three and the same on the fourth. Staff wrote that Peraton’s answers to use cases and direct questions “often focused on matters irrelevant to the discussion topic.”
Peraton scored better on past performance, helped by a positive review from NASA. The FAA told Bloomberg that strong ratings from Peraton’s customers, including NASA, were among its reasons for the choice, along with what it called the company’s significant telecommunications experience. The presentation also showed that Peraton sought a higher award fee than Parsons; it is unclear whether that changed later in the process.
Politico reported in June that a former Duffy spokesperson, Mark Bednar, who now sits on the board of the nonprofit that paid for Duffy’s road-trip video series, Great American Road Trip Inc., had lobbied for Peraton in the period when it won its FAA contract. At a December 2025 congressional hearing, Bedford said career FAA staff ran the selection without interference from Duffy or Trump. The recommendation went from Bedford to Duffy and then to the president, he said, and Trump demanded a $200 million cut in the fee.
Concerns about Peraton’s work have since dogged the program. A few months ago, the FAA called Peraton in and told it to improve its performance, and the company blamed the agency in return, Bloomberg reported, citing a person familiar with the matter. The FAA has said it hasn’t penalized Peraton or issued the company a formal warning about poor performance.
A Peraton spokesperson told Bloomberg in August that the program is on track. But the company said the schedule is among the largest and most complex in government history, covering 330,000 independent projects and half a million dependencies. Peraton did not respond to an inquiry for this story.
Duffy used the outage to renew and even scale up his call for Congress to fund the larger telecom modernization effort, arguing the $12.5 billion already allocated is not enough. For weeks, he has been calling for $30 billion in additional funds—with only about $10 billion of that request specifically for air traffic modernization—but during the outage he raised the demand to $50 billion. Bedford said the FAA would review its upgrade protocols. Neither said whether copper-to-fiber cutovers would be paused while investigators work out why and how one router could halt the country’s air traffic.
Representative James Walkinshaw (D-Va.), a member of the House Oversight Committee, said on Saturday that Duffy must be questioned by Congress, including about why the work was being conducted “on a busy travel day, as opposed to in the middle of the night where a disruption wouldn’t have been so damaging because they’re rushing.”